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The resistible rise of the temporary employment industry in France 




This article is an historical account of the contested growth of the temporary employment agency 
sector in France. It utilises a variegated capitalism conceptual framework to explain the evolution of a 
distinctive temporary employment agency sector and regulatory environment under French politico-
institutional conditions that was contingent upon global developments. The article charts the role of 
large agencies in constructing a market for agency labour despite wide scale cultural, political and 
trade union opposition. In order to build legitimacy, agencies sought partners in the labour movement 
from the late 1960s onwards. By the late 1990s, the sector had grown significantly within a gradually 
more permissive regulatory framework despite ongoing but fragmenting opposition. The article 
demonstrates that the growth of agency labour was not an inevitable outcome of global pressure for 
labour market deregulation. It also reveals how national regulatory institutions alone are not a 
sufficient bulwark against global labour market pressures. 
 





The widespread growth of temporary agency labour across Europe and globally since the 1980s is a 
significant labour market development. Despite the small proportion of workers involved, the growth 
of agency labour has ‘transformed the structure of employment relations’ (Coe et al., 2010: 1055) 
because, as a legal form of casual employment, it underpins the wider institutionalisation of job 
insecurity as a permanent, structural feature of contemporary labour markets (Helfen, 2015; Strauss 
and Fudge, 2014). Agency labour’s expanding and deepening presence therefore is politically 
significant and a ‘bellwether’ of wider labour market change (Jordhus-Lier et al., 2015: 115). 
Consequently, the temporary employment agency (TEA) sector’s growth internationally has generated 
a literature addressing the expansion of agency labour across occupations and sectors, the 
characteristics of agency workers (Ehrhel et al., 2009; Eurofound, 2006; Forde and Slater, 2005; 
Glaymann, 2006) and agency work’s detrimental impact on job quality and working lives (French and 
Morkhe, 2006; Gorgeu and Mathieu, 2011; MacKay and Markova, 2010; Sporton, 2013). Studies 
highlight the negative consequences of this form of employment, particularly how a significant 
proportion of agency labour is low- and un-skilled and trapped in a cycle of low paid and insecure 
work (e.g. Eichorst et al., 2013; Eurofound, 2015). Ethnographic research and in-depth investigative 
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reporting has provided insight into the negative consequences of low-skilled agency labour in France, 
documenting daily humiliations and low-pay (Martinez, 2003; Aubenas, 2011). A further body of 
research has turned attention to how the active role of TEAs in labour ‘market-making’ activities (Coe 
et al., 2009) is crucial to the sector’s expansion and institutionalisation through altering employer 
practice and employee expectations within specific national labour markets (Coe and Ward, 2014; 
Jordhus-Lier et al., 2015).  
 
The importance of TEAs as ‘active institutional agents in the remaking of labour market norms and 
conventions’ was established in early work by Peck and Theodore (2001: 474), marking an important 
break from earlier, predominant accounts of agency labour that presented agencies as neutral 
intermediaries between temporary workers and user-organisations (see Forde and Slater, 2005). Since 
then there have been a number of studies exploring the active role of TEAs in creating permanently 
available, transient workforces, and the impact on pay and conditions for workers channelled into 
accessing employment as agency labour (Coe et al., 2010; Peck et al., 2005; Peck and Theodore, 2007a). 
These studies focus on the social processes by which agencies ‘simultaneously construct and inhabit’ 
(Strauss and Fudge, 2014: 10) their markets and regulatory contexts, often confronted by hostile 
labour movements and reluctant governments, as was the case to varying degrees in Norway 
(Jordhus-Lier et al., 2015), France (Purcell et al., 2011), Germany and Belgium (Pulignano et al., 2015). 
The role of TEAs as ‘strategic, profit-seeking actors that play an active role in the ongoing restructuring 
of labour markets’ (Jordhus-Lier et al., 2015: 115) is well illustrated by the history of the sector in 
France. While there has been a revival of this history in recent years in France (Belkacem and Kornig, 
2011), it is relatively absent in the predominantly Anglophone literature on the TEA sector. 
 
The long term emergence of a large, well-organised and influential French TEA sector occurred despite 
extensive regulation restricting agency activity. Furthermore, large sections of French society, 
especially much of the labour movement, have demonstrated a persistent and tenacious attachment 
to the continuing de jure use of the standard (permanent) employment contract, the Contrat du durée 
indeterminée (CDI), throughout most of the post-1945 period. Successive attempts by governments 
of various political complexions to liberalise labour markets generally has been met with determined 
resistance by trade unions, often allied with powerful movements of students and young workers, as 
illustrated by the mobilisation in 2015-2016 against the Socialist government’s new labour laws. It is 
within this context that the TEA sector emerged from the shadowy margins of the 1950s French labour 
market to form a zone of exception within French employment relations, and to become by the turn 
of the century a powerful institutional labour market presence wielding significant and growing 
politico-economic influence.  
This article accounts for the long-term embedding of TEAs in the French employment landscape by 
tracing their transformation from barely tolerated purveyors of ad hoc labour sourcing, at a time of 
full employment and labour scarcity in the 1950s (Caire, 1973), to key partners in governmental efforts 
to address the high structural unemployment that has dogged France since the 1980s. Thus, the wider 
significance of the sector’s contested growth in France is today’s  broad acceptance by the bulk of the 
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French national polity of the central importance of the free-market-oriented TEA sector, despite the 
long-standing support for an extensive framework of market, business and labour regulation. 
 
The article begins with a discussion of the general growth of agency labour in Europe and France in 
order to set out the case of France in relation to other European countries. The remainder of the article 
is structured chronologically around four phases from the early 1950s onwards. Focusing on the 
‘agency of agencies’ (Jordhus-Lier et al., 2015: 115), the article examines how the TEA sector has 
actively carved-out and grown its presence within an evolving politico-economic and institutional 
setting, marked by the interplay of continuity and change. To achieve this, the variegated capitalism 
conceptual framework (Peck and Theodore, 2007b) is utilised to apprehend how the TEA sector has 
been able to grow across diverse institutional, national settings and flourish in a country such as 
France. 
 
Agency labour under variegated capitalism 
While temporary agency work still represents a small proportion of employment, typically between 
1% and 2.5% across much of the European Union (EU), the rate of growth since the late 1990s is 
substantial (Table 1). The rapid expansion of agency labour into countries with no history of it (e.g. 
Greece, Italy, Sweden) signals a trend towards the normalisation of agency employment within diverse 
contemporary labour markets. Where agency work is well established, this process has been more 
incremental, but one which has had far-reaching, systemic effects on labour markets and their 
regulatory regimes (Strauss and Fudge, 2014). A number of country studies have sought to understand 
the social processes that have led to the sectors’ growth, initially in the more liberal market-oriented 
economies of the USA (Peck and Theodore, 2007a), the UK (Forde, 2008; Ward, 2005) and Australia 
(Coe et al., 2010), and in the more regulated economies of Norway (Jordhus-Lier et al.,ß 2015), Belgium 
and Germany (Helfen, 2015; Ferreira, 2016; Pulignano et al., 2015). These latter studies begin to 
address a paucity of knowledge on TEAs in more regulated national contexts (Coe and Ward, 2014).  
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Table 1. Agency workers as a proportion (%) of the total active population in EU countries 
1996-2013. Source: Ciett Economic Reports 2012-2015 
 
This literature demonstrates that while the rise of temporary agency work has to be understood in the 
context of a common, international tendency towards the loosening of labour market and 
employment regulation, this process of liberalisation is differentiated and contested across a diverse 
range of national economies (Peck and Theodore 2007b; Jessop, 2014). The expansion of agency 
labour is a contingent process, the outcome of which is the combined and uneven development of 
agency labour across local, national and regional settings within global capitalist markets (Jordhus-
Lier et al., 2015; Peck and Theodore, 2007b). Consequently national and supra-national institutional 
arrangements that enable or constrain the activities of agencies differ considerably, especially 
between the more liberal, Anglophone market economies and those Western European states with 
stronger regulatory traditions (see Heyes et al., 2014). Despite TEAs ‘acute sensitivity to regulatory 
conditions’ (Jordhus-Lier et al., 2015: 115) they have succeeded in establishing themselves within a 
diverse range of labour markets via the use of locally adapted business strategies in tandem with 
international-level activities, including extensive political lobbying (Coe and Ward, 2014).  
 
TEAs are affected by three principal areas of regulation: regulation that determines the form, extent 
and terms of agencies’ activities (e.g. licensing requirements and sectoral restrictions on TEA activities); 
regulation that concerns the nature, terms and conditions of temporary employment in relation to 
statutory, contractual ‘standard employment’; and the state welfare regulatory framework that shapes 
the socio-economic terms and conditions under which workers are prepared to undertake temporary 
agency labour. It is these aspects of the multi-scalar national and supra-national state that primarily 
structure the formal conditions under which agencies operate (Coe and Ward, 2014). Regulatory 
conditions generate a series of thresholds to what is permissible and legitimate for TEAs to pursue. 
However, these thresholds are commonly permeable due to being tested and even renegotiated by a 
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host of institutions and actors, not least the sector’s own peak national and international 
organisations.  
 
Acknowledging the wider institutional and multi-scalar context in this way challenges the 
commonplace, but much criticised, dichotomous characterisation of liberal economies and 
coordinated market economies associated with the varieties-of-capitalism (VOC) approach to 
comparative employment relations (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Heyes et al., 2014). Central to the VOC 
approach is the concept of institutional complementarity (Hall and Soskice, 2001) by which national 
models of capitalism are constitutive of distinct bundles of institutions that complement and reinforce 
each other. Those countries clustered around the liberal market economy model tend to rely 
principally on market mechanisms to resolve problems of economic management, while in 
coordinated market economies, non-market regulatory measures tend to be favoured. While VOC 
provides an important counterbalance to over-deterministic convergence theories of globalisation, it 
does not offer a convincing account of the dynamic interplay between domestic institutions and 
international politico-economic market and institutional pressures for change. Instead it 
overemphasises the capacity of the former to resist ‘external’ neoliberal globalising forces (Heyes et 
al., 2014; Peck and Theodore, 2007b), thereby underestimating how the interrelationship of 
international, national and local factors can affect incremental change in national institutions.  
In contrast to the VOC model, Peck and Theodore’s (2007b) variegated capitalism approach offers a 
more dynamic account of the complex ways domestic and international politico-economic 
phenomena interact to shape local labour markets. Variegated capitalism challenges VOC’s neo-
institutional assumptions of path-dependency by offering an approach that commences from the 
uneven but combined development of national labour markets, underpinned by interrelatedness and 
contingent change. By focusing on meso-level developments that may circumvent national 
institutional arrangements, variegated capitalism emphasises the dynamic intersection between 
global politico-economic forces and existing local-regional institutions to explain how ‘owners, 
managers and workers react to, conform with, deviate from or recreate institutions’ (Vidal and 
Hauptmeier, 2014: 21). Specifically, employing a multi-scalar understanding to institutional change 
rather than VOC’s predominantly mono-scalar typology (Zhang and Peck, 2016: 57) provides an 
analytic framework that can explain how the TEA sector can emerge and succeed across a diverse 
range of national economies.  
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Figure 2. Agency workers in France as a proportion (%) of the total active population. Source: 
INSEE (2016) 
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The development and growth of agency labour in a country such as France illustrates a process of 
variegated outcomes within a tightly regulated economy, and a legal and cultural context that 
traditionally views agency labour as an unacceptable deviation from the standard employment 
relationship (Belkacem, 2013). Across the French economy, agency labour is still a marginal form of 
employment constituting only 2% of the active workforce (Figure 2). However, historically France has 
had one of the higher rates of agency labour in Europe despite being considered as closer to the 
VOC’s cluster of co-ordinated market economy, given its tightly regulated state-led market economy 
(Milner, 2015:12). By way of contrast, in Germany it was only after the implementation of the 2003 
liberalising Hartz reforms that agency labour as a proportion of the workforce began to catch up with 
France (Belkacem et al., 2014: 24). France’s strict employment protection for permanent employees is 
said to have encouraged the use of agency labour (Belkacem et al., 2014), though the same did not 
occur in most other European countries with extensive employment protection. Moreover, agency 
labour in France has long been subject to strict regulation to limit its use, principally by imposing a 
requirement for equal treatment between agency and permanent workers from the first day of a 
temporary contract. Despite these institutional barriers, there has been a gradual growth in agency 
labour in France both in absolute terms (Figure 1), and, to a lesser extent, as a proportion of the total 
active population (Figure 2).  
 
Agency work in France has long been promoted by its proponents as a stepping-stone into permanent 
employment and even a positive, life-style choice for some (Jourdain, 2002). However, for many it has 
become either an obligatory or the sole route into employment of any form, and a lengthening and 
uncertain pathway into permanent employment. Those who choose agency labour over other forms 
of employment are a minority (Lacroux and Larbi, 2009; Barnier, 2014). Agency labour in France is 
increasingly present among older-cohort workers with the proportion of agency workers under the 
age of 30 declining from 59% in 1995 to 44% in 2014. Over the same period the proportion of agency 




Table 2. Distribution of agency workers (%) in France by age group 1995-2014 (selected 
years). Source: DARES 2015 
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Agency workers experience poor health and safety conditions due to a lack of training and experience 
(Tone et al., 2016). Consequently, the sector has the second highest rate of workplace accidents and 
fatalities (DARES, 2016). In the French construction sector agency workers are significantly more likely 
than their permanent co-workers to report osteoarticular and auditory problems (Tone et al., 2016). 
In some manufacturing sectors in France, such as the metal industry, agency workers are twice as likely 
as permanent employees to suffer a workplace accident (Lacroux and Larbi, 2009). One explanation 
for such a large difference – and poorer working conditions – is that agency labour is concentrated 
disproportionately in physically arduous and more hazardous jobs (DARES, 2016).  
 
While a high proportion of agency workers are in occupations and industries more susceptible to 
unsafe working conditions, exposure to this kind of risk is also a consequence of structural features of 
the agency contract and their manifestation in the use made of agency labour by user-organisations. 
Thus, agency labour’s deployment tends to generate three interrelated forms of vulnerability for the 
agency worker: a physical fragility due to the short-term nature of the work so that agency workers 
lack experience in specific tasks; a statutory fragility that leaves agency workers exposed to the most 
arduous and difficult tasks; and a psychological fragility rooted in the inability to envisage a stable 
employment future (Belkacem and Montcharmont, 2012). This assessment of the human cost of 
agency labour is also supported by recent studies of agency labour in French auto-manufacturing 
(Gorgeu and Matthieu, 2011; Purcell et al., 2011; Purcell, 2014). Furthermore, it is in those sectors, such 
as auto-manufacturing and construction, where agency labour is integral, large scale and deployed 
strategically for its flexibility that, as a pathway into other employment it is now obligatory, prolonged 
and uncertain.  
 
Although in the immediate post-1945 decades French agency labour was predominantly made up of 
female clerical workers (Vigneau, 2008; Belkacem et al., 2011), the subsequent development of the 
sector significantly modified the gender profile of temporary agency workers. Male workers account 
for nearly three quarters of agency workers, with the proportion of female workers increasing only 
marginally over the last two decades from 25% in 1995 to 27% in 20141. In terms of occupational 
status, while there has been a decline in the proportion of manual workers (ouvriers) and an increase 
in the proportion of white collar occupations (employés), manual workers still represent a large 
proportion of agency workers, constituting 77% in 2014 (down from 84% in 2000) compared with 23% 
for white-collar occupations (up from 16% in 2014) (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Distribution of agency workers (%) in France by occupation status 2000-2014. 




Figure 4. Agency workers in France as a proportion (%) of total employment by sector 2007-
2014. Source: DARES 2015 
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Figure 4 shows the proportion of agency labour in manufacturing and construction, reaching a high 
of 7.5% and 8.8% of total employment respectively in 2007 before bottoming-out at 5% in 2009 as 
France entered into recession. Within manufacturing, it is the auto sector that has made the most 
extensive use of agency labour. From 2000 up until the 2008 financial crash, agency labour in the auto 
sector frequently accounted for over 10% of the workforce (Gorgeu and Mathieu, 2011: 79). These 
high rates at the sectoral level give substance to the variegated capitalism thesis by illustrating the 
strategic, tailored responses of local, meso-level actors to the pressures of global capitalism. In the 
case of the auto sector, TEAs provided employers with the means to deviate from institutional norms 
(Purcell et al, 2011), demonstrating their role as ‘rule makers’ as well as ‘rule takers’ (Zhang and Peck, 
2016: 57) as they engage in localised practices of mutual interdependence with other actors, the 
outcome of which can be incremental systemic change. The following sections illustrate this process 
by charting how key actors in the French TEA sector have engaged in practices and alliances that have 
facilitated their liberalising agenda since their emergence in the post-war years.  
The Wild West years 
Agency work in France emerged in its modern form in the 1950s, a period of reconstruction and 
economic boom following the destruction of war and occupation. The immediate post-war years 
(1945-1947) were a period of cooperation between state, business and labour, resulting in important 
gains in the area of employment rights (Ross, 1982). The progressive modification of the statutory 
Code du travail (Labour Code) and the introduction of employment-related welfare insurance 
protections alongside the regimes speciaux for specific groups of workers (e.g. rail workers and miners) 
significantly modified employment relations for an increasing number of workers. Stable employment 
was still the preserve of a small minority of workers at this time, and for some workers the freedom of 
what was increasingly referred to as ‘atypical’ work was viewed positively, not only for women seeking 
to combine work with family life, but also for those who did want to be tied to one employer 
(Fourcade, 1992; Sauze, 2005). However, the CDI was becoming the benchmark for measuring 
employment quality and progressively became the employment norm (Fourcade, 1992; IRES, 2009). 
The emergence of temporary agency labour in the 1950s at the margins of the labour market was at 
odds with this trend towards stable employment, as more workers in newly nationalised companies 
and larger private sector firms came under the protective umbrella of the CDI (Fourcade, 1992; 
Belkacem et al., 2011). Moreover, TEAs were commonly viewed as socially regressive businesses 
engaged in disreputable activities; a sentiment encapsulated in the title of Guy Caire’s (1973) 
influential study Les nouveaux marchands d’hommes? Étude du travail intérimaire (The new traders in 
men? Studies in agency work). Not only was there trade union hostility to agency labour but post-war 
policy-makers were ambivalent towards TEAs, vacillating between an outright ban and strong 
regulation to inhibit their activities (Belkacem, 2013). Despite this, the limited data that exist suggest 
that the supply of temporary workers grew rapidly from the late 1950s onwards, albeit from a 
miniscule base, primarily due to labour shortages under conditions of full-employment. In the five-
year period between 1957 and 1962, there was an estimated increase in the numbers of agency 
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workers from 6,000 to over 33,000 (Caire, 1973: 45; Kornig, 2003: 40). By 1964, this had nearly doubled 
to 66,393 (Caire, 1973: 45). A number of accounts highlight the prevalence of female dominated 
administrative and secretarial work at this time, (Vigneau, 2008:86; Belkacem et al., 2011:19), however 
there is also evidence that during the 1960s French TEAs were branching out into manufacturing and 
construction (Caire, 1973; Pialoux, 1979).  
TEAs grew rapidly in number during this period. Caire (1973) puts the number of agencies in 1956 at 
seven; by 1962 there were 170. The sector continued to grow throughout the 1960s with large 
numbers of small companies existing alongside a smaller number of nationally-embedded agencies. 
The lack of regulation meant that there was little risk involved in setting up an employment agency. 
Start-up costs were minimal – all that was needed was ‘a room and a telephone’ (Belkacem et al., 2011: 
24) – while the demand for employment services in a tight labour market guaranteed a good return 
(Grunelius, 2003). The lack of TEA regulation combined with a favourable labour market provided 
boom conditions for what were commonly viewed as opportunistic and avaricious agents, driven 
almost exclusively by ‘financial gain’ (Le Tourneur, 1969: 13-14, cited in Belkacem, 2000: 142). 
The negative image of the sector was exacerbated by the activities of some of the smaller agencies 
who engaged in strike-breaking and were renowned for their bad treatment of agency workers 
(Kornig, 2003). This propelled the larger, more strategically-inclined agencies to distance themselves 
from the smaller rogue operators in order to present themselves as reputable businesses with a 
legitimate role in the labour market (Pialoux, 1979). Fearful that the activities of the sector would be 
prohibited, the big agencies lobbied the government to provide a delimited regulatory framework 
within which the sector could operate. As one large company CEO explained in 1971:  
The functioning and use of temporary work has been seriously hindered by the absence 
of an adequate legal status. This situation….has allowed firms of all kinds to open agencies 
in an anarchic way during recent years and to run them in a questionable manner. It is 
well known that the growth of the profession attracts those who seek to make a quick 
profit rather than engage in a natural vocation. (Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, 
1971: 6723, cited in Kornig, 2003: 43) 
 
Interventions of this kind were designed to counter the industry’s critics by appealing to the more 
social-oriented values of the Fifth Republic by condemning ruthlessly pecuniary, smaller operators. 
The prevalence of disreputable agencies was at odds with the evolving social mores of post-war 
France and risked hindering the sector’s development, particularly as it expanded into those sectors 
with a significant trade union presence. In manufacturing for example, the influential Communist-
leaning Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) was strong, while the then fiercely militant 
Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) had a strong presence in the retail sector (see 
Ross, 1982).  
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Establishing and building TEAs in the 1950s and 1960s, when organised labour was advancing its 
influence and employee rights, demanded that companies pooled their resources to challenge the 
sector’s negative image by engaging actively in public debate on employment policy. An early 
manifestation of this was the establishment of ad hoc sectoral study groups in the 1960s with the aim 
of presenting empirical evidence to promote the positive role of agency work for both workers and 
businesses (Caire, 1973). The sector also developed mechanisms of self-regulation, underpinned by 
voluntary codes of conduct, prefiguring contemporary concerns with corporate social responsibility. 
By 1967, these early forms of agency association had been formalised with the establishment of a 
national federation, Société Nationale des Entreprises du Travail Temporaire (SNETT), which brought 
together the larger agencies, such as Manpower and BIS. One of SNETT’s core founding aims was to 
‘clean up’ the profession by establishing a professional charter and sector norms. Significantly, SNETT 
set itself the task of establishing contacts with public policy bodies and decision-makers (Caire, 1973: 
42). 
An international organisation, the Confédération Internationale des Enterprises du Travail Temporaire 
(CIETT) was also established in Paris in 1967. The choice to base CIETT in France was not an obvious 
one given the UK TEA market was the cradle and the largest market for agency labour in Europe 
(Belkacem and Kornig, 2011). On the other hand, CIETT was a powerful advocate for the French TEA 
sector’s quest for legal recognition and greater legitimacy. By contrast, the British sector did not face 
a serious threat to its activities, and was focusing instead on a campaign to gain access to the state 
monopoly on employment placements (Forde, 2008). The contrast between the neighbouring TEA 
markets of France and the UK illustrate how their combined yet uneven development generates a 
variegated and polymorphic European-level TEA sector in which national-based sectors pursue 
divergent priorities and market opportunities dependent on the evolving regulatory, economic and 
socio-political context in which they operate. The resolution of divergent interests at the international 
level is not always obvious. CIETT has sought to promote the legitimacy of agency labour in 
unfavourable national contexts, and therefore has readily accepted regulation of the sector as 
embedding its presence. By contrast, the more benign market and political conditions for the UK TEA 
sector has encouraged it to oppose regulation as restrictive and anti-competitive, most recently in 
relation to the EU Directive on Temporary Agency Work (Kountouros, 2008).  
Tête à tête: Manpower and the CGT  
It is impossible to tell the story of agency labour in France without reference to the role played by 
Manpower France2 in propelling forward the sector’s strategic aim of gaining respectability in a 
country that eschewed agencies as marchands d’hommes. The evolution of agency labour and its 
regulatory environment owes much to the business strategy of Manpower. The autobiography of 
Michaël Grunelius, founder of Manpower France, provides some insight into the barriers TEAs faced 
in overcoming social stigma and hostility (Grunelius, 2003). Central to this is the company’s success in 
convincing the CGT to enter into a joint agreement that allowed Manpower to present itself as the 
acceptable face of agency labour, a move which laid the basis for the legalisation of agency labour in 
1972. Grunelius was inspired by the USA-based parent, Manpower, which had successfully expanded 
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beyond the traditional feminised administrative and secretarial employment markets for temporary 
agency work in the American labour market during the 1940s and 1950s. In this regard, the post-1945 
expansion of Taylorist mass-production was fortuitous, since American manufacturing employment 
was increasingly dominated by fragmented, low-skill work, which was ideally suited to the use of 
agency workers to meet short-term labour gaps (Peck and Theodore, 2002). Manpower was keen to 
achieve the same in France, viewing the auto industry as a potentially lucrative market: 
 
… in manufacturing, when demand was exceptionally high, overtime was no longer 
sufficient and it was necessary to turn to external resources. In addition, certain sectors, 
like the auto-industry, were becoming heavily automated and each unforeseen absence 
needed to be immediately filled to avoid slowing down the production line. So the 
potential market for temporary agency staff seemed to be, statistically, at least three times 
higher than that of office staff (Grunelius, 2003: 48).  
 
However, accessing this market was problematic given these industrial sectors were ‘bastions of the 
working class’; labour unions were likely to ‘make life hard’ were Manpower to offer their services to 
industrial employers (Grunelius, 2003: 48). Despite these reservations, Manpower Industrie was 
launched in 1960. Union activists did indeed ‘make life hard’. The company became a target of militant 
action which escalated during the 1968 General Strike. Office façades were defaced with graffiti and 
windows were smashed. One of the posters during the strike depicted Manpower, alongside the 
advertising agency Publicis, as a reviled symbol of capitalism and at the height of the strike Manpower 
Industrie’s offices were occupied (Grunelius, 2003: 75-78).  
In the aftermath of 1968 the trade union confederations were even more politically powerful and 
confident. Consequently, TEAs were fearful that governmental-level negotiations over new labour laws 
would result in the abolition of agencies and agency labour. Manpower’s response was to approach 
union confederations with the aim of reaching a voluntary agreement on the use and protection of 
agency labour. After a series of rejections it was the CGT, the largest confederation that responded 
positively. The ground breaking negotiations with the CGT that followed resulted in an agreement in 
1969 that ultimately secured the future of the sector by becoming the model for the 1972 labour law 
that formally legalised and regulated agency labour and agencies.  
The CGT, opposed to agency work in principle, was confronted with the paradox of how to protect 
agency workers whilst simultaneously opposing a casualised form of work which undermines secure 
employment conditions. Furthermore, the CGT negotiators were in a weak position, having virtually 
no agency worker members. However, they recognised that there was a real chance to improve the 
situation of agency workers since Manpower wanted the agreement not only as a bargaining chip 
with the government but also as a way of improving the ‘brand’ image of the company (Tartakowsky, 
1985). By establishing minimum standards, the company hoped to distance itself further from other 
agencies and present itself as a ‘good’ employer (Caire, 1973). The agreement with the CGT effectively 
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averted the outlawing of the sector and guaranteed its long-term survival. Significantly, it included 
the de facto acceptance of the positive function of agency work in the labour market by 
acknowledging the industry’s contention that agencies were neutral labour market intermediaries 
matching employers with those who voluntarily choose agency labour above permanent employment. 
This was a contentious point for French organised labour and the CGT, as the largest and most 
powerful confederation, faced heavy criticism, including from its own members (Caire, 1973). While 
union confederations in France co-existed in a conflictual and competitive relationship (Ross, 1982), 
all three main unions the CGT, Force Ouvrière (FO) and the CFDT opposed agency labour during this 
period.  
Legalisation and restrictive regulation 
The legalisation of agency work in 1972 redefined the employment relationship for a small but 
growing segment of the labour force, creating a formal zone of liberalised, flexible employment 
alongside the standard employment contract. The strict codification within the Code du travail of the 
employment relationship necessitated the resolution of various complex contradictions arising out of 
temporary agency employment before the law could be passed. In addition, the business activities of 
TEAs needed to be reconciled with French legislation on the supply of workers to a third party 
(Vigneau, 2008). These issues gave rise to extensive debates across the media between opponents 
and proponents of agency work. The temporary employment sector was a major contributor to the 
debate, engaging in a well-resourced campaign to convince the National Assembly legislature and 
public opinion of its economic and social legitimacy (Caire, 1973; Grunelius, 2003).  
 
The National Assembly’s report on legalising temporary agency work drew special attention to the 
problem of whether it was the agency or the user-organisation that was the actual employer, since 
both had responsibilities that could be attributed to an employer (Caire, 1973). Under the Code du 
travail the employment contract is defined as a convention by which a person engages to put their 
employment/activity at the disposition of another person, under the subordination of this person, in 
return for remuneration (Pélissier et al., 2006). In practice this means that the employer has the legal 
authority to ‘give instructions to the worker, to control their execution [of the work] and to sanction 
non-performance’ (Havard et al., 2009: 260). Since subordination refers to the execution of work and 
occurs at the point of production, there was a strong case for the user-organisation to be designated 
as the employer (Caire, 1973). For TEAs this was a crucial point of deliberation since securing the status 
of employer would underpin their de jure legalisation and longer-term social legitimacy. The 1972 law 
duly resolved this by giving TEAs the status of employer. A new type of contract, the contrat de mission 
(assignment contract) was established existing alongside a commercial contract between the agency 
and the user-organisation. The triadic relationship was thereby articulated within two interdependent 
and simultaneous contracts. In adopting this solution, the National Assembly was drawing heavily 
upon work that had been carried out by Manpower to reconcile agency labour with French labour law 
(Caire, 1973; Grunelius, 2003). 
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However, TEAs were also subject to limits on the scope of their activities. Agencies’ activities were 
limited exclusively to the business of supplying temporary workers to client organisations, but only 
under the following three conditions:  
1. To temporarily replace an absent employee;  
2. To allow organisations to function during exceptional peaks in activity;  
3. To undertake duties that are by nature temporary. 
  (Article 2 Law no. 72-1, Journal Officiel, 5th January 1972) 
The principle that agency work should be of limited duration was established by two key elements of 
the legislation. First, the stipulation that agency work ‘can have neither as an aim nor as its effect to 
permanently fill a job related to the normal and permanent activity of a company’ (Journal Officiel, 
1972: 141-144). Second, the requirement to justify the use of agency work with reference to clearly 
defined organisational objectives (‘tasks’). User-organisations were, in theory, unable to assign 
successive agency contracts to the same post. The legislation also set out three specific circumstances 
under which the use of agency contracts was prohibited: the replacement of striking workers; 
undertaking work and occupations deemed dangerous; and during the first six months following 
redundancies of permanent employees. Strict prohibition in these areas is an indication of the 
significant political influence of organised labour in the immediate post-1968 period and continuing 
widespread suspicion of TEA practices and motives. Overall, the legislation represented a compromise 
that the larger TEAs could accept. They were now freed from the uncertainty, underpinned by a fear 
of prohibition that had beset the sector. Some of the smaller agencies were less resilient to the 
restrictions placed on their activities. This and other regulatory compromises that followed began a 
long-term process of high market concentration in the French TEA sector; by 2004, four companies 
accounted for 70% of market share - and two alone, Adecco and Manpower, accounted for 46% 
(Michon and Belkacem, 2011: 44).  
Although the TEA sector had gained formal legitimacy, agency labour was still heavily contested, not 
least by the trade union movement. Nonetheless agency labour grew considerably in the 1970s (Caire, 
1973). By the beginning of the 1980s, when Mitterrand’s socialist government came to power, there 
were approximately 100,000 agency workers (see Figure 1). During the election campaign, the Socialist 
Party (PS) promised to ban TEAs and provide the under-resourced Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi 
(ANPE) with sufficient funds to effectively implement the formal state monopoly on employment 
services, including temporary placements (Belkacem, 2013). As in 1968, hostility to agency work was 
highly visible during the election campaign; in anticipation of an electoral victory by the left, activists 
had fly-posted agencies with posters proclaiming ‘outlawed!’ (Grunelius, 2003).  
Again it was Manpower that initiated the sector’s counter-offensive by pleading the TEA case at a 
meeting in 1981 with Jean Auroux, the new Socialist minister of labour. The resulting compromise 
amended the 1972 law by reducing further the range of circumstances under which employers could 
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use agency work, and by strengthening the rights of agency workers. The government also pledged 
to reinforce state monitoring of agency work in view of its ‘harmful role’ if used as a substitute for 
permanent work (Grunelius, 2003: 110), an implicit acknowledgement that agency labour was being 
used outside of the parameters of the 1972 law. The combined pressures of tighter regulation and 
worsening economic conditions led to a decline in the number of agency workers (Figure 1) alongside 
a dramatic drop in the number of registered companies supplying agency workers, falling from 1,518 
in 1980 to 800 in 1984, as smaller agencies struggled to survive under the tighter regulatory 
environment (Roux, 2011: 336). For the larger agencies things were less bleak, as they were able to 
increase their market share as the sector become more concentrated. Moreover, by establishing a 
statutory framework for national negotiations between unions and TEAs, the 1982 legislation 
facilitated the deepening institutionalisation of agency labour.  
 
Contested regulation and legitimacy  
By 1983, deteriorating economic circumstances brought Mitterrand’s radical reform programme to an 
abrupt end. Faced with rising unemployment and high inflation, the government switched direction 
to pursue a liberal deregulatory approach (Daley, 1993) aimed at enhancing French competitiveness 
in the global market. A key plank of this was labour market flexibility to promote job creation. A new 
consensus between government, employers, and the PS-supporting CFDT union, was emerging; in 
order to restore competitiveness and profitability the cost of labour needed to be reduced (Sarafati 
and Kobrin, 1987). For agency work legislation, this meant the relaxation of the maximum duration of 
agency labour contracts – providing manufacturers could demonstrate they needed long term 
contracts to cope with production for export. By 1986 Chirac’s new coalition government of the right 
felt able to pursue labour market flexibility tenaciously (Daley, 1993). The government loosened 
restrictions on the use of agency labour and increased the maximum duration of contracts to 18 
months. This was underpinned by an emerging policy discourse that spoke positively of agency 
labour’s role as a means of labour market entry for young unemployed workers and school-leavers. 
The changing political climate enabled larger agencies to consolidate and extend their relationship 
with client companies. As numerical labour market flexibility became an instrument of adjustment 
(buffer) against macro-economic shocks (Eamets and Masso, 2005) agencies increasingly became 
mediators in labour allocation in those sectors acutely susceptible to competitive global markets.  
 
By the end of the 1980s the now highly concentrated TEA sector was in a position to offer a large-
scale solution to manufacturing’s flexible staffing requirements arising from the common adoption of 
just-in-time production techniques, and to promote the idea of agency work as a strategic element 
of human resource management (Erhel et al., 2009). The changing economic environment and the 
high levels of unemployment undermined the post-war interventionist model of labour relations in 
France, laying the basis for a piecemeal, locally adapted form of labour market liberalisation. Unable 
to fundamentally destabilise the standard employment relationship by legislative means, the 
pressures of international neoliberal capitalism were channelled towards differentiated and variegated 
flexible labour market practices facilitated by well organised TEA sector.  
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This process is well illustrated by the permanent, strategic use of agency labour in manufacturing. 
Between 1992 and 2002 the proportion of agency workers in manufacturing rose from 2% to 6.8%; in 
the same period permanent jobs fell by 7.5% (DARES, 2005). This period also saw a shift in the type of 
atypical employment in manufacturing away from the fixed term Contract de durée déterminée (CDD). 
In 1992 temporary contracts were more likely to be CDD contracts, however by 2002 agency labour 
had overtaken CDDs across manufacturing industries. In auto-manufacturing agency contracts 
represented 2.2 % of employment contracts in 1992. By 2002 this had risen to 11.8% (DARES, 2005: 
3). High penetration rates in the sector were facilitated by close commercial relationships between 
manufacturers and TEAs, where the latter helped auto-companies adapt their labour sourcing more 
closely to the requirements of just-in-time production via the establishment of dedicated offices in 
close proximity to factories (Beaud and Pialoux, 1999). Agency labour also provided manufacturers 
with the opportunity to evaluate individual agency workers before taking some of them on as 
permanent employees, a widespread practice that was prohibited by law (Gorgeu and Mathieu, 2011). 
Long-term, large-scale agreements with TEAs also enabled auto-companies to make economies of 
scale by reducing agency fees and allowed manufacturers to keep a set proportion of production line 
workers on fixed lower grades. These new practices highlight the strategic ‘rule-making’ capacity of 
TEAs (and their clients) as they established new governance structures enabling them to deviate from 
national regulatory regimes (Zhang and Peck, 2016: 57).  
Consolidation and institutionalisation  
From the late 1990s onwards the increase in agency labour in auto-manufacturing became an issue 
of persistent, growing union and public concern. There was a steady increase in critical press coverage 
of the plight of young auto workers on precarious agency contracts, as the number of secure, 
permanent jobs declined (Purcell, 2014). During the late 1990s and early 2000s, agency workers 
accounted for up to 30% of the workforce at some plants (Gorgeu and Matthieu, 2011: 81). It was 
during this period of rising public concern that the reconfigured employers’ organisation, SETT 
(Syndicats des Entreprises de Travail Temporaire) held its first Forum du travail temporaire, bringing 
together TEA leaders, government ministers, academics and representatives of CIETT to shape debates 
on employment policy and influence decision-makers. At this first forum, the president of CIETT 
reported how struck he was that many young people expressed no desire to follow their parents’ 
experience of entering into permanent employment early on in their careers (SETT, 1999: 28). This 
anecdotal remark was aimed at a labour movement portrayed as clinging on to anachronistic 
employment norms that no longer corresponded to the aspirations of new generations of workers.  
A number of themes emerged in the forums, notably labour market integration of young workers, the 
reduction of long-term unemployment, and the cultivation of ‘professional pathways’ through training 
and development. The reports of the forums provide an indication of the sector’s changing relations 
with government.  The 1999 forum was addressed by a representative of the Socialist government and 
involved a robust exchange with one speaker claiming that too much state welfare reduced the pool 
of labour available for agencies (SETT, 1999: 41). The 2005 Forum took place in a very different 
atmosphere. In January 2005, the Law on Social Cohesion (Loi Borloo) had ended the state monopoly 
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of permanent job placements and extended the range of conditions under which agency work was 
permitted. In particular the employment needs of individual agency workers were taken into account 
for the first time. These changes effectively institutionalised the role of TEAs in public employment 
policy by making TEAs official partners of the state employment service, something that had been 
gradually developing, unofficially, for some time (Belkacem and Kornig, 2011). The significance of the 
changes was acknowledged by the then Vice-President of SETT:  
Twenty years ago we were considered as creators of precariousness. Today we are actors 
in the employment market. This transformation of our image opens up many possibilities 
for change. Similarly, from the point of view of job-seekers, we are going to be able to 
take charge of a much larger population, made up of all those seeking work. Our image 
is transformed and valorised by the social cohesion plan. (SETT, 2005: 14)  
 
SETT could now congratulate itself that the sector was one of the principle vectors of training for 
young people (SETT, 2005: 8). The 2011 forum, under the theme of The Employment Agency: At the 
Heart of Job Creation, pursued the idea of TEAs as core players in the labour market, at the ‘epicentre’ 
of labour market dynamics due to their expertise and local knowledge (PRISME3, 2011: 4). 
The challenges posed by promoting numerical flexibility in a country strongly attached to the standard 
employment relationship constituted a major part of the discussions in the SETT forums, at times 
becoming a quasi-sociological debate on the nature of work and employment within French society, 
given the obstacles to pursuing the liberalisation of employment in the French context. While this 
context conditioned and constrained the evolution of the sector, TEAs were, nonetheless, able to effect 
gradual institutional change. SETT had encouraged sympathetic academic participation in the forums 
to help build an independent case for the legitimate role of agencies in the contemporary labour 
market, strengthening the sector’s objective of ‘influencing legislation and attitudes’ (PRISME, 2007: 
9). This long-term success enabled the 2007 forum to focus on removing the barriers to agency labour 
in the public sector – which was partially achieved in 2009.  
 
By the end of the opening decade of the century, political, cultural and industrial opposition to the 
existence of temporary agency labour appeared to pose little threat to the sector’s continued 
development. Nevertheless the 2013 national TEA accord de branche that established a new type of 
permanent contract for temporary agency employees (CDI interim) took over five months of fraught 
negotiations with the five union confederations, concluding with the CGT and FO refusing to sign the 
final agreement (Belkacem et al., 2014). Resistance to the further development of a sector seen to 
trade in precarious employment has not therefore been totally quelled.  
 
Conclusion: the long road to institutional précarité  
The development of temporary agency labour in France has confirmed the fears of trade unions that 
its statutory regulation would facilitate its institutionalisation and growth. Furthermore, TEAs have so 
successfully overcome their pariah status that they are now commonly considered to be partenaires 
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priviligiés (favoured partners) of the state in the development of labour market and employment 
policy (Belkacem, 2013). The sector has survived restrictive legislation as well as the legislative 
uncertainty resulting from governmental alternance between right and left. This process has been 
primarily reliant on the activities of a small number of large agencies that dominate the sector, a 
consequence of the acute concentrating effect on the industry of restrictive legislation.  
A lack of political will to enforce regulations is also a factor in the sector’s long-term success. 
Successive governments tolerated the widespread use of agency labour beyond legal boundaries 
(Purcell et al., 2011). This was principally due to the tacit acceptance by the PS and some trade unions 
of the need for greater labour market flexibility to get young workers into employment, even if under 
the guise of pursuing labour market flexicurité (Milner, 2012). This growing consensus from the mid-
1980s onwards created an environment in which the lobbying and public relations practices of the 
TEA sector gained an increasingly sympathetic ear at governmental level. Moreover, demand from 
employers for agency labour was astutely cultivated by TEAs, as they transformed their services from 
the ad hoc supply of stop-gap workers to a strategic labour-sourcing function for client companies 
and entire industries such as auto-manufacturing. 
This history of the sector’s growth and institutionalisation is a compelling illustration of Peck and 
Theodore’s (2007b) variegated capitalism and the analytical significance of multi-scalarity. The 
‘construction sociale’ (Belkacem and Kornig, 2011: 1) of the French TEA market has produced a 
distinctive national sector that has been a vector for labour market flexibility, and thereby an 
incremental neo-liberalisation of French employment relations. The economic context certainly 
encouraged this. The inability to make significant inroads in combatting unemployment since the 
1980s, coupled with the constraints placed on monetary policy as a result of fiscal preparation for the 
single European currency, elevated the importance of labour market flexibility as a solution to high 
unemployment among young workers and as a buffer against macro-economic shocks. The persistent 
resistance of the French labour movement to major de-regulation of employment protections for 
permanent workers gave additional impetus to the growth of agency labour at the margins of the 
regulatory regime where lawfulness is opaque and enforcement minimal. National-level institutions 
therefore are not solely constrained by their own internal logics. These compete and coalesce with a 
range of rationales and pressures arising from related, dynamic multi-scalar processes, often 
emanating outside their immediate realm of jurisdiction and influence.  
 
There are similarities with the histories of TEAs in the liberal market environments of the US and the 
UK, not least the central role played by Manpower in propelling legislative and market developments 
through its pursuit of a ‘politics of legitimacy’ (Forde, 2008: 353). However, in France TEAs were 
confronted by a rigorously codified standard employment relationship that was safeguarded by an 
influential labour movement. A key breakthrough was Manpower’s 1969 agreement with the CGT, 
which breached the hitherto unified political opposition to agency employment in France and enabled 
the codified legalisation of TEA activities. The main legacy of the agreement was the legalisation of 
the whole sector and its subsequent expansion and legitimisation.  
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Institutions are dynamic social phenomena, as they are simultaneously reproduced and transformed 
by the actions of the actors that inhabit them. This has important implications for those concerned 
with presenting a normative challenge to deregulatory labour market tendencies and their neoliberal 
ideas, since it weakens any reliance on the hope that more regulatory inclined national capitalisms 
can provide resilient institutional bulwarks against the recommodification of labour (Peck and 
Theodore, 2007b). In the case of the French TEA sector, its persistence in facilitating non-standard 
work practices at the margins of core labour markets and pushing the limits of legal enforcement had 
an incrementally corrosive effect on the labour market’s institutional infrastructure.  
 
The widely acknowledged unlawful use of agency labour in auto-manufacturing for example, was 
permitted due to a range of interrelated contingent factors: the political exigencies arising from 
persistently high unemployment; the strengthening neoliberal political consensus on the need for 
greater labour market flexibility; and weak enforcement of agency labour regulations through 
systemic under-resourcing of key state agencies, such as the labour inspectorate (Purcell et al., 2014). 
Added to the mix is the weakness of French unions at the workplace level. Meso-level labour markets 
are acutely sensitive to the labour resourcing strategies of major employers. As the use of agency 
labour to fill entry-level jobs became an industry-standard in auto-manufacturing (Viprey, 2002), this 
created a locked-in relationship with TEAs providing access to a permanent pool of agency workers 
(Gorgeu and Matthieu, 2009). This in turn erected a major barrier to stable employment, especially for 
young workers in regions heavily dependent on auto-industry jobs (Purcell et al., 2011). 
 
Since the 1970s national states have succumbed in varying degrees to increasing global market 
pressures to enhance flexibility for capital by deregulating workers’ protection and recommodifying 
labour (Greer, 2016; Heyes et al., 2014). Although there are common dynamics, features and 
consequences to the international growth of agency labour, the contours and specificities within each 
national setting are variegated. Each national labour market, with its own institutions and various 
actors, is the product of distinctive politico-economic histories, particularly the struggles between 
capital and labour, such as the impact of the 1968 French general strike on agencies’ strategies as 
they strove to ensure the survival of their industry.  
The contemporary labour market in France still formally displays the features of decommodified 
labour by intervening in such ways as to significantly loosen labour market discipline for most workers 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990), but this level of protection has been undermined since the 1990s, especially 
for growing numbers of young workers. The existence of variegated labour markets has, over the 
years, mitigated against French employers’ failure to achieve the kind of far-reaching 
recommodification of labour seen in the UK since the early 1980s (Greer, 2016). The struggle over the 
latest attempt to reform labour laws, the Loi El Khomri, is testimony to a persistent aspiration for 
employment security. Over time, the post-1945 regime of institutional protection and rights common 
for standard workers has been dismantled for agency employees by local politico-economic processes 
combined with powerful global liberalising tendencies, the outcome of an overarching neoliberal 
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narrative on the need for more flexible labour markets and greater competitiveness (Peck and 
Theodore, 2007b). The history of the French TEA sector reveals that macro-institutional arrangements 
in nation states with strong regulatory traditions do not necessarily provide a long-term domestic 
bulwark against global deregulatory and recommodification tendencies. This was not an inevitable 
process in France. A less divided trade union movement, matched by the political will to ensure 
enforcement of regulations on the ground could have better impeded and limited the advance of 
agency labour into sectors and occupations that were previously bastions of secure, standard 
employment. In the absence of this, the ‘ecological dominance’ of neoliberalism (Jessop, 2014: 254) 
was able to bypass national institutional channels and undermine post-war employment protections. 
Notes 
1. DARES time series data on the profile of agency workers: http://dares.travail-
emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/xls/donnees_annuelles_sur_l_interim_2015.xls  
2. US-based Manpower Group initially expanded into France in 1957 and in 1960 established Manpower 
France as a franchised subsidiary (Grunelius, 2003). 
3. SETT was renamed Professionnels du Recrutement et de l’Intérim (PRISME) in 2006. 
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